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Abstract
Implicit in fiscal policy debates is that there is a trade-off between output and debt outcomes; stimulus
is at the expense of debt, and austerity at the expense of output. This paper theoretically and empirically
investigates this trade-off through analysing the relationship between traditional output multipliers and
‘debt multipliers’ (the impact of policy on government debt). Theoretically the elasticity between the
two is the marginal tax rate from movements of output in response to policy. This leads to two further
hypotheses: first, if the marginal tax rate in the private sector is higher than that in the public sector,
changes in government spending will result in a larger impact on debt than changes in taxes; and second,
‘fiscal free lunches’ are possible with recent estimates of the output multiplier. Indeed, empirically we
find that tax revenues increase from exogenous tax cuts when the response of output is high.
1 Introduction
Fiscal policy has received much attention since the global financial crisis as many governments used stimulus
packages in the face of depressed demand. Much of this academic and political attention has been in the form
of debating the fiscal policy multiplier; the impact of changes in government spending and taxes on output.
As budget deficits persisted, policy moved towards austerity as rising levels of debt became a key political
narrative. Since then, debate has continued over best policy in a changing macroeconomic environment,
with discussions largely concerned with the trade-off between output and debt objectives.
Implicit in these debates is that whereas austerity is bad for economic growth, stimulus is at the expense
of higher government debt. There are two main objections to this: first, the relationship between policy and
debt is not frequently analysed in the literature, where discussions tend to centre around the impact of policy
on output; and second, there is a small literature suggesting that such trade-offs may not exist under certain
circumstances. For example, some find empirical evidence that fiscal contractions can be expansionary to
output (see for example Alesina et al. 2014), with theoretical transmission mechanisms coming from private
agents’ expectations about future government policy (see for example Blanchard 1990, McManus et al. 2017).
Others find the potential for ‘fiscal free lunches’ where the economic environment is so conducive to fiscal
stimulus that tax bases are increased to such a magnitude that there is no increase in debt as a result of
fiscal stimuli (see for example Erceg & Linde´ 2014, McManus et al. 2017).1 These literatures investigate two
outcomes where the trade-off between output and debt with respect to fiscal policy does not exist.
1In this paper, we use the expression ‘expansionary fiscal contractions’ to represent a fiscal contraction (cut in spending
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The implicit assumption of a fiscal trade-off between output and debt objectives further requires investi-
gation given high estimates of output multipliers in the recent empirical literature. Intuition suggests that a
large response of output to policy would lead to large movements in the tax base of the economy, alleviating
the financing constraint of any fiscal expansions; multipliers in excess of two have been recently estimated
in many papers (see for example Romer & Romer 2010, Mertens & Ravn 2013, Cloyne 2013, Acconcia et al.
2014, among others). Further, there is a growing empirical literature estimating the impact of fiscal policy
to be asymmetric over the business cycle, with larger output multipliers estimated during recessions, when
there is slack in the economy (see for example Auerbach & Gorodnichenko 2012, Bachmann & Sims 2012,
Caggiano et al. 2015). Asymmetric responses of output to fiscal interventions would suggest a varying degree
of trade-off to policy over the course of the business cycle, providing scope for innovations to the design of
optimal policy.
This paper develops a deeper understanding of the relationship between output and government debt
as a result of fiscal actions to further consider the presence of the perceived trade-off between these two
macroeconomic outcomes. It does this through applying three different methodologies; first, a simple gov-
ernment budget constraint is analysed to build benchmark intuition on the relationship between the two
macroeconomic outcomes. This intuition is then tested and developed in a medium scale dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) model, with a rich fiscal sector. Finally, the theoretical results are empirically
tested applying datasets which have previously estimated large output multipliers.
The theoretical results hypothesise that in response to fiscal policy the elasticity of debt with respect
the output multiplier is the negative of the marginal tax rate of the economy; that is, expansionary policy
will increase government debt by the size of the policy less additional tax revenues as a result of increased
output. This marginal tax rate is determined by both the sources and the level of taxes within an economy,
and rigidities which influence transmission mechanisms of policy. Two implications arise from this theo-
retical hypothesis: first, with low levels of fiscal multipliers, changes in government spending will influence
government borrowing more than changes in taxes, if the public sector pays taxes at a lower rate than the
private sector. With low output multipliers, changes in government spending shift resources between the
public and private sectors which has significant impacts on the budgetary consequences of policy. This result
is complimentary with that which finds government spending cuts more likely to lead to ‘expansionary fiscal
contractions’ compared to tax rises (see for example Alesina et al. 2014); although our result cannot talk
to the empirical regularity of this distinction, it provides a theoretical framework through which this can
occur, and further, through which these outcomes might be more discernible in the data. The second result
derived from the theoretical intuition is that at levels of tax to GDP observed in OECD countries, potential
‘fiscal free lunches’ are possible with output multipliers recently estimated in the literature, and discussed
above. Indeed, there is strong support for our theoretical model when it is tested against empirical data, and
therefore, support for potential fiscal free lunches. Specifically, applying data from Romer & Romer (2010)
- where output multipliers in excess of 3 were estimated - results suggest that total tax revenues increase in
response to a tax rate decrease, when the output effects of the policy are large.
In addition to the contributions to both the ‘expansionary contractions’ and ‘fiscal free lunches’ literature,
we further contribute to the growing body of papers finding asymmetric fiscal multipliers through quantifying
or rise in taxes) which is met with a reduction in debt and no fall in output. Ee use ‘fiscal free lunches’ to represent a fiscal
stimulus (a rise in spending or cut in taxes) which is met with lower in government debt. In both cases the outcomes are similar
(favourable output and debt dynamics) but the initial policy action is different.
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the corresponding influence this will have on policy trade-offs. A unit change in the output multiplier over the
course of the business cycle (a change conservatively within the range of estimates, see for example Caggiano
et al. 2015) reduces the trade-off of expansionary policy on government debt by 0.3 - 0.5 at current OECD
tax rates; that is, deficit financed expansionary policy during recessions will come at a smaller trade-off if
future contractionary policy is performed during economic expansions.
The paper proceeds in the following way. Section 2 builds a simple theoretical model with which to
derive intuition of the relationship between output and debt in response to fiscal policy; this intuition is then
tested through simulations of a medium scale DSGE model with a rich fiscal sector in Section 3. Section
4 empirically tests these theoretical relationships using narrative tax data for the US and UK. Section 5
discusses the results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Benchmark results
This section develops a set of benchmark results for the relationship between output and debt dynamics as
a result of fiscal policy. A single equation approach is applied, analysing a government budget constraint
to derive intuitive results; these results are then tested in the next section in a medium scale DSGE model
with a rich fiscal sector.
Consider a simple government budget constraint where the level of debt (Bt) is the difference between
government spending (Gt) and tax revenue (Tt) plus the interest and capital from previous debt (Rt−1Bt−1),
where Rt−1 is one plus the real interest rate, and where tax revenue is a proportion of national output (τtYt):2
Bt = Gt − Tt +Rt−1Bt−1 = Gt − τtYt +Rt−1Bt−1 (1)
If this expression is totally differentiated with respect to G one gets:
dBt
dGt
=
∂Bt
∂Gt
dGt
dGt
+
∂Bt
∂τt
dτt
dGt
+
∂Bt
∂Yt
dYt
dGt
+
∂Bt
∂Bt−1
dBt−1
dGt
+
∂Bt
∂Rt−1
dRt−1
dGt
(2)
and noting that ∂Bt/∂Gt = 1, ∂Bt/∂τt = −Yt, ∂Bt/∂Yt = −τt, dBt−1/dGt = 0 and dRt−1/dGt = 0 leaves:
dBt
dGt
= 1− Yt dτt
dGt
− τt dYt
dGt
Allow dτt/dGt = 0, that is, tax rates do not respond contemporaneously to changes in government spending;
this simplifying assumption is temporary, and analysis from a fuller model will occur in the next section.
Finally, letting the government spending output multiplier (dYt/dGt) be represented by mG one obtains:
dBt
dGt
= 1− τtmG (3)
2Note that implicitly the assumption that output coincides with income is only true in a closed economy. The sensitivity of
the results to a model with an open economy is studied further in Section 3.4 below.
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Following a similar process totally differentiating (1) with respect to tax revenue:
dBt
dTt
=
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∂Gt
dGt
dTt
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∂Bt
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+
∂Bt
∂Yt
dYt
dTt
+
∂Bt
∂Bt−1
dBt−1
dTt
+
∂Bt
∂rt
dRt−1
dTt
=
dGt
dTt
− Y dτt
dTt
− τt dYt
dTt
and noting that dτt/dTt = 1/Y , setting dG/dTt = 0, and denoting the tax revenue output multiplier
(dYt/dTt) by mτ one obtains:
dBt
dTt
= −1− τtmτ (4)
which is analytically similar to the result with respect to government spending. Taken together (3) and
(4) state that the response of debt to changes in government spending and taxation are functions of how
these two influence output, the tax base of the economy; higher output multipliers (mG and mτ ) lead to
smaller debt multipliers. When output responds strongly to policy, tax bases change which alleviates the
government’s budget constraint (1). In this respect, τ represents the marginal elasticity of tax revenue
with respect to output; a unit increase in the output multiplier leads to τ additional (less) revenue from
expansionary (contractionary) policy. Considering ‘expansionary contractions’, when output multipliers are
zero (mG = mτ = 0) the response of debt to changes in fiscal policy are one-for-one; that is, there is no
movement in the tax base as a result of policy and as such government borrowing increases one-for-one with
the fiscal change. On the other hand, when output multipliers reach a critical value (mG = mτ = 1/τt)
changes in fiscal instruments have no contemporaneous impact on debt (potential ‘fiscal free lunches’).3
The above analysis assumes that the tax base is the whole economy and the government pays taxes on
their transactions at the same rate as those in the private sector. Changing this assumption and taking it to
the other extreme, we can assume that no taxes are paid in the public sector. Representing the output and
the tax rate of the private sector by Y ′ and τ ′ respectively, and substituting these into (1), the equivalent of
(3) and (4) become:
dBt
dGt
= (1 + τ ′t)− τ ′tmG (5)
dBt
dTt
= −1− τ ′tmτ (6)
These results are similar to those of (3) and (4) with two key exceptions. First, note that the constant on
the impact of government spending changes on debt has increased from 1 to 1 + τ ′. This states that were
3The Haavelmo Theorem (Haavelmo 1945) suggests that a balanced budget government spending expansion can occur with
an output multiplier of just one. To derive this result, a balanced budget is imposed such that G = T and ∆G = ∆T , and
therefore all additional economic activity must be taxed by the government. This reconciles with the result above as it is
in effect imposing that τt = 1. The Haavelmo Theorem states that balanced budget fiscal expansions can occur, although
disposable incomes in the economy remain fixed as all additional activity is collected in tax revenues. DeLong & Summers
(2012) use a model with hysteresis to demonstrate fiscal expansions can be self-financing with small output multipliers in a
depressed economy, providing that they are accompanied by modest improvements in medium to long run growth.
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Figure 1: Output and debt multipliers: single equation model
1/τ 1/τ
1 + τ
1
1/τ = (1 + τ ′)/τ ′
Output multiplier
Debt multiplier
Result (3) and (4)
Result (5)
Result (6)
Graphical representation for the results identified in equations (3)-(6) where tax output multipliers have been multiplied by
negative one in order to make them comparable to spending multipliers (therefore, a positive tax output multiplier in the graph
represents the case where tax cuts lead to higher output). Note that if we let Y ′ and G represent output in the private and
public sector (and therefore Y = G + Y ′), and we let γ represent the share of private sector to total output (γ = Y ′/Y ) then
if there were no debt in steady state, T = G and T/Y = τ = 1− γ. Under these conditions, the ratio of tax revenue to the tax
base (τ ′) is given by (1− γ)/γ. In this scenario, it is straight forward to demonstrate 1/τ = (1 + τ ′)/τ ′.
there to be no impact on output from policy (mG = 0) an increase (decrease) in government spending would
lead to a shift in activity from the private sector to the public sector leading to lower (higher) tax revenues;
an output multiplier of one (mG = 1) would lead to a one-for-one impact of policy on debt, as this is where
there is no crowding in or out of the tax paying private sector. Note that this change in the constant is
not present for the relationship between debt and tax based fiscal policy (6), as tax based policy does not
experience the same issue of changing the share of the non-tax paying public sector.
The second difference in (5)-(6) from (3)-(4), is the elasticity of the debt multiplier to the output multiplier
has changed from τ to τ ′. Note that τ ′ ≥ τ (T/Y ′ ≥ T/Y ) because at the extreme the tax base of the
economy is limited to total output (Y ≥ Y ′). This means that the elasticity between output and debt
multipliers is higher in an economy where the tax base is less than total output, because tax rates are higher
for a given level of revenue. As such, an increase in economic activity increases tax revenue at a higher
marginal rate.
These results are presented in Figure 1 which is constructed under the assumption of no steady state debt
in the economy and where the public sector pays no tax.4 It is clear that the elasticity of debt multipliers
to output multipliers is stronger when less tax is taken from the public sector. Further, it is illustrated
that for a given output multiplier, the response of debt to a change in taxes is lower than of the response
of debt to a change in government spending; if the public sector pays less taxes than the private sector,
increasing the former at the expense of the latter will reduce tax revenues, all other things being equal. This
4These simplifying assumptions play no qualitative role in the relationships and allows for the identification of values in
Figure 1 without needing to assume steady state debt levels and interest rates.
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result is complimentary with the literature which finds that expansionary fiscal contractions are more likely
with government spending cuts than tax rises (see for example Alesina et al. 2014); although the results in
Figure 1 cannot talk to the empirical likelihood of a specific result, they do suggest that cuts in government
spending will lead to higher reductions in debt compared to tax rises, all other things being equal.
To put these results in context, the average level of tax-revenue-to-GDP in OECD countries between 1965
and 2014 was 31.4%, with the country with the highest and lowest average over the period being Sweden
(43.4%) and Mexico (13.8%). Over this period, average tax rates have increased decade-on-decade, with
26% of GDP taxed between 1965-69 compared with 33.6% between 2010 and 2014; the highest tax-revenue-
to-GDP during the period was in Denmark in 2014 (49.6%) and the lowest in Turkey in 1970 (9.3%). At the
mean average tax rate for 2010-2014, this would put an upper bound for potential ‘fiscal free lunches’ being
possible with output multipliers of 3.0 using (3) and (4).
From this analysis, three intuitive results can be taken for further investigation: first, the elasticity of the
response of debt to fiscal intervention with respect to the output multiplier is the negative of the marginal tax
rate from additional output; second, providing the government pays taxes at a lower rate on their activities
than the private sector, movements in government spending lead to larger responses of public debt compared
to tax policy, for a given level of output multiplier; and finally, using empirical tax rates for OECD countries,
fiscal free lunches are plausible with output multipliers recently estimated in the literature (see Section 1
above and Table 2 below). These results are tested in a fuller DSGE model in the next section.
3 General equilibrium analysis
The results from analysing a simple government budget constraint are clear and intuitive; this section builds
upon these by extending the analysis to a medium-scale DSGE model. A fiscal authority with a rich set of
instruments is embedded into an otherwise workforce DSGE model similar to that of Smets & Wouters (2003).
The model contains: nominal rigidities in prices and wages; investment adjustment costs; a proportion of
agents who consume hand-to-mouth (‘non-Ricardian’ households) and others who have full access to credit
and capital in order to smooth consumption (‘Ricardian’ households); and a monetary authority following
a Taylor rule. The model is then simulated over a number of calibrations using a Monte Carlo process and
output and debt multipliers are calculated to determine if the relationship between these two identified above
is consistent with this fuller model.
3.1 The model
The model applied is a Smets & Wouters (2003) framework with extensions of the inclusion of non-Ricardian
households and a richer fiscal authority; a full description of the model equations can be found in Appendix
A.1.5 The conduct of fiscal policy is important to the results, and as such is discussed in more detail here.
The fiscal authority allocates spending to public purchases of goods, investment, employment and transfers
(GCt , I
G
t , N
G
t and TRt, respectively) and collects revenue from taxes on consumption, labour income, capital
income and employers’ social security contributions (τ ct , τ
l
t , τ
k
t and τ
er
t , respectively). Thus, the government
budget constraint is given by:
5‘Non-Ricardian’ households are increasingly common in the literature and agents who consume hand-to-mouth provide for
models to generate a bigger range of fiscal multipliers; something important for the exercises to follow.
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GCt + I
G
t + (1 + τ
er
t )wtN
G
t + TRt = Bt −
Rt−1Bt−1
pit
+ τ ct Ct + τ
l
twtLt + τ
k
t rtKt−1 + τ
er
t wtNt (7)
where wt and Nt represent the wage and quantity of labour in private production; Rt and pit the nominal
interest rate and inflation; and where Ct, Lt, rt and Kt represent the level of consumption, total labour
supply, the return on capital and the level of capital respectively.
A simple rule is applied for the evolution of each fiscal instrument (x = {GC , IG, NG, TR, τ c, τ l, τk, τer})
where spending and taxes respond to: the business cycle (governed by the parameter ϕy,x); the level of debt
(governed by the parameter ϕb,x); and by their own shock component (εx):
xt = x
(
Bt−1
B
)−ϕb,x (Yt−1
Y
)−ϕy,x
εx,t (8)
εx,t = ρxεx,t−1 + ηx,t
From the analysis above, the difference in results between (3)-(4) and (5)-(6) was the extent to which
governments pay taxes similar to the private sector. A review of (7) identifies that: governments do not
pay taxes on consumption, unlike the private sector; neither the public nor private sector pay taxes on
investment, but whereas the private sector pays taxes on the income from this investment, the public sector
does not; employees and employers of both the public and private sector pay the same taxes; and, the extent
to which transfers relate to additional tax revenue (at least in the first instance) is determined by the actions
of households on how to allocate these transfers. All these assumptions are common in the literature (see
for example Coenen et al. 2012) and provide a range of scenarios against which to test the intuition of the
difference between (3)-(4) and (5)-(6).
The model is simulated under different calibrations of parameters and cumulative multipliers as a result
of fiscal shocks (ηx,t) are recorded through the following equation:
mnk =
∑n
j=0 (kt+n − k0)∑n
j=0 (xt+n − x0)
(9)
where n is the time horizon over which multipliers are calculated, k is the macroeconomic variable of interest,
x is the fiscal instrument in question, and where both k0 and x0 represent their respective steady state values.
When k = Y output multipliers prevail whereas when k = B debt multipliers are achieved. In the case of
government spending instruments, the monetary value of the changes in spending are used in the denominator
of (9); for tax instruments, the denominator in (9) is the change in tax revenue that would prevail in an
economy where all other variables are at their steady state, apart from the tax rate in question. This way,
changes in output as a result of fiscal policy only impact the the numerator of (9) which allows multiplier
values to be comparable between those coming from changes to government spending and those from changes
in taxation; this is the approach taken in McManus et al. (2017).6
6Note that if ex-post tax revenues were to enter the denominator of (9) to measure tax multipliers, both the numerator
and denominator will change as a result of differing impacts on output. As this would not occur for changes in government
spending, where the shock in spending is fixed but the impact this has on the economy will effect tax revenues, it is preferable
to have a measure where tax multipliers and government spending multipliers are comparable.
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3.2 Calibration and simulations
In order to consider the relationship between output and debt responses to fiscal policy in this DSGE
framework, a number of calibrations of the above model are applied to derive a range of output and debt
multipliers over different time horizons. For benchmark results, the economy is calibrated to the US for
which the existing literature provides substantial guidance, and which is consistent with the empirical work
in Section 4 which uses data from both the US and UK; the results are robust to other calibrations, including
to calibrating the model to the UK, as demonstrated in Section 3.4. For these calibrations, a Monte Carlo
simulation is run calling values from distributions for each parameter in the model. Each parameter is
modelled to come from a distribution which is calibrated to have the same first and second moments of the
posterior distribution for these parameters estimated in Smets & Wouters (2007). The distributions used for
each parameter can be found in the Appendix A.2. Using this Monte Carlo method, the intuition derived
from Section 2 can be tested in this richer macroeconomic model.
For the calibration of steady state fiscal values, we use Trabandt & Uhlig (2011); specifically, the share
of government consumption, investment, and public employment to GDP is set at 0.15, 0.04 and 0.10
respectively, and taxes on consumption, labour, capital and employers’ social security contributions are set
at 0.05, 0.2, 0.36 and 0.07, respectively. With debt to (annual) GDP calibrated to 60%, this leaves the ratio
of transfers to GDP being set by the model at 0.10.7 For benchmarks results we fix the calibration of those
parameters in the fiscal rules: debt aversion (ϕb,x = |0.1|) is set low which is both consistent with empirical
observations (fiscal instruments respond slowly to debt) and calibrations in other estimated models; policy
is set to be mildly counter-cyclical (ϕy,x = |0.2|); and fiscal persistence is calibrated in line with estimates
from the literature (ρx = 0.85).
3.3 Results
Intuitively, there are two main differences between the DSGE model and the analysis performed in Section 2,
that will influence the relationship between debt and output movements: first, the presence of distortionary
taxes means that fiscal revenue is now derived from a number of sources, and movements in tax rates change
incentives in the economy; and second, the DSGE model includes other rigidities within its transmission
mechanisms which can provide a further wedge in the relationship between output and tax revenues. For
example, both revenue from labour income taxes and employer social security contributions are a function
of wages, which are themselves subject to stickiness. Further, whereas capital taxes have a direct impact on
the investment decisions of agents, capital income taxes are taken from the stock of capital in (7) and not
the flow of investment.
Figure 2 presents results from the Monte Carlo exercise calibrating the DSGE model over a 1,000 different
simulations and deriving output and debt multipliers for the eight fiscal instruments in the model. In each
panel: a point represents results for four quarter cumulative output (x-axis) and debt multipliers (y-axis);
the solid line represents an estimated line of best fit across these multiplier coordinates; and the dashed lines
represents 95% confidence intervals for this line of best fit. Considering the first row in Figure 2, that which
refers to government spending instruments, the main relationship found in (3)-(6) is obtained; that is, higher
output multipliers lead to lower debt multipliers as movements in the tax base reduces the trade-off between
7Data from the World Bank gives the average ratio of government debt to GDP in the US between 1990 and 2016 at 59.4%.
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Figure 2: Four quarter cumulative output and debt multipliers in DSGE simulations
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Figures illustrating four quarter cumulative output and debt multipliers in DSGE simulations for the eight fiscal instruments.
For each iteration of the model a new calibration of parameters is randomly assigned from distributions set to match those
estimated in Smets & Wouters (2007). A line line of best fit is plotted with 95% confidence bounds.
financing and GDP as a result of fiscal policy.8 In general, there is a strong correlation between output and
debt multipliers for government spending instruments: correlation coefficients of -0.78, -0.81, -0.97 and -0.86
are recorded for the four instruments as laid out in Figure 2.
The relationship between output and debt multipliers is less consistent for tax instruments, as illustrated
in the bottom row of Figure 2. The difference in results is due to the fact that distortionary taxes change
incentives and this is further compounded by the rigidities in the model. Whereas the relationship predicted
in Section 2 is present for consumption and labour taxes, it is absent for capital taxes and employer social
security contributions.9 These latter two taxes influence the first order conditions of producers and the
allocation between capital and labour in the economy. As discussed above, changes in allocations between
labour and capital can create distortions between output in the economy and the tax base; whereas capital
taxes influence investment decisions (and expenditure on investment goods directly contributes to GDP),
taxes are taken on the stock (and not flow) of capital. For example, an increase in capital taxes leads
to an increase in labour and consumption tax revenue (as resources are allocated away from capital and
into labour), with only modest short run reductions in capital income taxes as the stock of capital is slow
to respond to investment. Therefore, distortions which result in different allocations between capital and
labour drive a wedge between output and tax bases in this economy. Over the short run, the immediate
8Different fiscal policies stimulate different sources of tax revenue: increases in government consumption and investment
lead to more revenues from labour and capital taxes; increases in transfers and public employment lead to increases in revenue
from consumption and labour income taxes.
9Employer social security contributions have positive multiplier estimates on average leading from a crowding out of invest-
ment as a result of a cut in these taxes (as labour becomes relatively cheaper) and the fact that the cost of public employment
(including taxes) is included in the GDP calculation.
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impact of changes of these distortionary taxes can lead to the intuitive relationship between output and
budgetary outcomes from changes in tax rates to break down. This, therefore, means that there is less
consistent results between output and debt multipliers for tax instruments in general in the model compared
to spending instruments: correlation coefficients of -0.96, 0.39, -0.97 and 0.42 are recorded across the four
tax instruments as presented in Figure 2.
In order to better evaluate the consistency of results from Section 2 to the DSGE model, Table 1 presents
metrics on different lines of best fit for the relationship between output and debt multipliers (similar to
those in Figure 2) over four different time horizons: one, four, ten and twenty quarters.10 The first result
from Section 2 was that the elasticity of the debt multiplier with respect to the output multiplier will be
the negative of the tax share in the economy. In the calibration of the model, this tax share is 0.32 and
for spending instruments the elasticity is stronger than this, especially in the short run (an average of -0.37
for ten quarter cumulative multipliers). This result is driven by the fact that the government does not pay
taxes on its activity as much as the private sector, and therefore this result is consistent with (5)-(6). For
tax instruments, the estimated elasticity is lower than predicted, and this is driven by the distortionary
nature of taxes in the economy leading to a weaker relationship between output and tax revenues. Note also
that as the time horizon over which multipliers are being measured increases, the results from all four tax
instruments converge. This demonstrates that as time extends over a longer horizon, giving the distortionary
consequences of tax policy scope to work through the economy, the intuitive relationship between output
and debt is present for all four instruments (and not just labour and consumption taxes).
Table 1: The relationship between debt and output multipliers over time
Elasticities Constant Free lunches Correlations
Qrt Spend Tax Taxc,l Spend Tax Taxc,l Spend Tax Taxc,l Spend Tax Taxc,l
1 -0.38 0.21 -0.38 1.01 -1.13 -1.00 2.68 -0.38 -2.65 -0.87 -0.29 -0.98
4 -0.38 -0.05 -0.32 1.02 -1.05 -0.97 2.72 1.00 -3.12 -0.86 -0.28 -0.96
10 -0.37 -0.25 -0.26 1.00 -0.92 -0.9 2.74 -4.26 -3.61 -0.86 -0.87 -0.92
20 -0.32 -0.26 -0.21 0.91 -0.88 -0.83 2.85 -3.51 -4.06 -0.87 -0.91 -0.87
Key statistics on the relationship between debt and output multipliers over time from DSGE simulations, aggregated by
government spending instruments (‘Spend’), tax instruments (‘Tax’) and just consumption and labour taxes (‘Taxc,l’), those
two taxes which display the expected relationship in Figure 2. ‘Elasticities’ relates to the mean average debt multiplier elasticity
with respect to the output multiplier across the fiscal instruments; ‘Constant’ the mean average value of the debt multiplier
when the output multiplier is zero across the instruments; ‘Free lunches’ the mean average value of the output multiplier where
it is estimated that the debt multiplier is zero; and ‘Correlations’ the mean average correlation coefficient between debt and
output multipliers across the fiscal instruments in the simulations. These are taken over one, four, ten and twenty quarters, as
displayed in the first column.
The second relationship predicted in Section 2 is that, all other things being equal, a change in government
spending will have a bigger impact on debt than a similar change in taxes. This result is only moderately
supported in the DSGE analysis. At low values of the output multiplier, Table 1 illustrates that spending
based instruments have a higher (in absolute terms) ‘constant’ than tax based instruments (when mG =
mT = 0). This is consistent with the relationship predicted in (5) and (6). Moreover, the policies where
10Note that Table 1 only presents information on the relationship between output and debt multipliers, and not the value of
these multipliers themselves. These are in line with the existing literature (see for example Coenen et al. 2012) and are available
on request.
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these constants are larger (government consumption and investment) are those where the government pays
no taxes on their activities, unlike the private sector; this further supports the intuition from (5) and (6).
The higher elasticity of the debt multiplier with respect to the output multiplier for government spending
instruments, however, means that when output multipliers are higher, spending based policy will have a
smaller impact on debt than tax based policy. This is demonstrated in lower levels of output multipliers
estimated to result in fiscal free lunches for government spending instruments in Table 1. The rigidities in
the model, and specifically the presence of distortionary taxation, makes this part of the intuition derived
from the difference in results from (3)-(4) to (5)-(6) to break down.
The final relationship predicted in Section 2 is that fiscal free lunches would be possible within the range
of recent estimates of output multipliers. For both government spending and tax based instruments, short
run multipliers in excess of 2.5 are predicted to lead potential fiscal free lunches, which are towards the higher
end of some recent multiplier estimates, but not outside the range of estimates (see Section 5 below). In
general, although there are some differences deriving from the presence of distortionary taxes in the economy,
the results from the DSGE model are broadly consistent with those from Section 2.
3.4 Sensitivity
The relationship between output and debt multipliers is dependent on the calibration of fiscal parameters
in the model. A higher steady state tax share in the economy leads to a lower (larger in absolute terms)
elasticity of debt multipliers, as predicted in Section 2.11 Further, a lower elasticity is experienced when
policy is more counter-cyclical (ϕy,x) and is more adverse to debt (ϕb,x); these two results come from the fact
that under both conditions other fiscal instruments respond quicker to the initial fiscal shock and therefore
debt is moved more quickly to steady state levels.12 Finally, a higher level of fiscal persistence (ρx) leads to
a lower elasticity of debt multipliers with respect to output multipliers. This is driven by the latter being
lower with higher shock persistence as more of the fiscal intervention is anticipated as it prolongs in the
economy; debt multipliers, however, remain similar independent of fiscal persistence.
Beyond fiscal policy calibrations, monetary policy parameters have the next most importance in deter-
mining the relationship between output and debt as a result of fiscal intervention. Higher levels of monetary
policy persistence (ρ) and lower aversions of the Taylor rule to deviations in inflation (ρpi) and output (ρy)
lead to lower movements in debt for a given multiplier, on average, across the eight fiscal instruments.13 In
each case, monetary policy is less responsive to the fiscal action leading to lower interest rates and thus,
both lowering interest obligations for the government and less crowding out by private agents. Beyond fiscal
and monetary policy calibrations, movements in other parameters are of less importance for the relationship
between output and debt multipliers. Of the remaining non-policy calibrations, the stickiness in both prices
and wages are the most important parameters. Higher levels of stickiness tend to increase output multipliers,
especially for government spending based policies but have little impact on budgetary outcomes. Beyond
this, individual parameter calibrations can effect the average multiplier values, but have a limit impact on
11Note, however, that differences in the level of steady state government debt (calibrated at 60% of GDP) has limited impact
on those results presented above.
12Notice these parameters will influence dτt/dGt and dBt−1/dGt in (2), the automatic stabilisers of other fiscal instruments
to movements in both output and debt.
13Notice these parameters will influence dRt−1/dGt in (2), that is, the impact of fiscal policy on the interest payments on
debt.
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the relationship between output and debt multipliers.14
Despite the above analysis providing a theoretical framework with which to consider the relationship
between output and debt, the variation in output multipliers is not in line with the extremes in both the
empirical and theoretical literature. Figure 3 presents similar results as above containing: simulations from
the benchmark model; a model which is extended to include a four quarter monetary policy zero lower bound;
and an open economy model. These latter two extensions represent models which are commonly found in the
literature to lead to both higher and lower fiscal output multipliers respectively. The results for government
spending output multipliers follow the established intuition with those in the open economy being smaller
than benchmark (as imports are a withdrawal from the system) and higher than benchmark when the
monetary zero lower bound is binding (as unresponsive monetary policy limits crowding out and additional
inflation lowers real interest rates). This intuition does not uniformly follow to tax output multipliers as
fiscal expansion at the zero lower bound can have deflationary impacts which can lead to a rising real interest
rate; these results are in line with Eggertsson (2010) and McManus et al. (2017).
Figure 3: Output and debt multiplier relationships: different model assumptions
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Results similar to those presented in Figure 2 now extended to include: the benchmark results; a model with international
trade; and a model with the monetary zero lower bound binding for four quarters. Results for each are represented by a different
symbol, as indicated in the legend.
These extensions, however, have little effect on the relationship between output and debt multipliers with
similar elasticities being observed in all instruments; the results are robust to these extensions. Stronger
elasticities between debt and output multipliers at the monetary zero lower bound are observed (which is
consistent with Erceg & Linde´ 2014, McManus et al. 2017, who find fiscal free lunches at output multipliers
14For example, a higher share of non-Ricardian households leads to higher output multipliers (most noticeably in the case of
changes in transfers and labour taxes) and therefore lower debt multipliers; however, the relationship between output and debt
remains consistent, independent of the calibration of these agents. Hayo & Neumeier (2017) present results from a survey of
households to suggest rule-of-thumb behaviour is prevalent in Germany.
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Figure 4: Twenty quarter cumulative output and debt multipliers in DSGE simulations: aggregation
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Figures illustrating twenty quarter cumulative output and debt multipliers in DSGE simulations aggregating both ‘government
spending’ and ‘taxation’ instruments by giving equal weights to each of the instruments from Figure 2. A line of best fit is
plotted and extrapolated with 95% confidence bounds. Results presented for a model calibrated to the US and UK economy.
of approximately 2) which is as a result of lower interest rates arising from (for example) expansionary policy,
as interest rates are temporary fixed to zero. Although lower average output multipliers are observed in an
open economy where some of domestic incomes are spent on imports, the elasticity between output and debt
multipliers remains consistent with those observed in Figure 2. The fiscal authority in the open economy still
collects revenue from the same sources and therefore the mechanisms are similar to those from the closed
economy, the difference now only comes from the higher marginal propensity to withdraw from the domestic
economy leading to lower output multipliers (and correspondingly, higher debt multipliers).
Finally, the DSGE model was calibrated to the UK economy, and a similar Monte Carlo simulation
performed using the posterior estimates for parameters from Smets & Wouters (2003).15 Figure 4 presents
results for twenty quarter cumulative multipliers where the four government spending and four tax based
fiscal instruments have been aggregated (similar to Table 1). The results from a model calibrated to the
UK are consistent with those from the US, with similar relationships between output and debt in response
to fiscal policy, and similar confidence ranges. A higher elasticity between output and debt multipliers is
observed for the UK, and this is consistent with the theory from Section 2 as the UK is calibrated to have
higher levels of tax in the economy than the US (37.6% tax revenues to GDP for the UK compared to 31.9%
in the US).
In all, the theoretical results and intuition form (3)-(6) is maintained in this bigger general equilibrium
framework where higher output multipliers are associated with lower debt multipliers as increases in tax bases
leads to more muted revenue responses to fiscal expansions. Variation in this relationship comes from both
15We use Bhattarai & Trzeciakiewicz (2017) to calibrate the fiscal parameters in the UK economy; namely, the shares of
government consumption, investment, public employment and transfers to GDP are calibrated to 0.2, 0.02, 0.10 and 0.16, and
taxes on consumption, labour, capital and employer social security contributions are calibrated at 0.2, 0.18, 0.29 and 0.07,
respectively. This leaves an average tax revenue to GDP ratio of 37.6% in steady state, which is close to the EU average
between 1965 and 2014 37.1%, using data from the OECD.
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distortions in taxation and rigidities in the model, and this variation is seen to diminish when multipliers
are measured over longer time horizons. The next section tests the relationship between output multipliers
and tax revenues empirically to see if the theoretical results are robust to observed dynamics.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Identification strategy
As frequently discussed in the empirical literature (see for example Blanchard & Perotti 2002), there is an
endogeniety concern when identifying the consequences of fiscal actions because were policy to be counter-
cyclical (expansionary in bad times and contractionary in good times), there would be a downward bias
on estimates of the output effects of policy. In response to this, Romer & Romer (2010) develop a dataset
for classifying US tax changes between those which are endogenous to the business cycle (those which
seek to influence short term growth) and those which are exogenous (performed for reasons beyond short run
growth) by analysing announcements about the policies (for example, presidential speeches, executive-branch
documents and congressional reports); this data was extended to UK tax changes by Cloyne (2013).
These datasets are used to analyse the theoretical relationships developed above for two main reasons:
first, the exogenous nature of the data allows for robust inference of these policy changes; and second, output
multipliers in excess of 2.5 are found in both Romer & Romer (2010) and Cloyne (2013) which the theoretical
results above suggest would lead to a limited response of debt to fiscal interventions. Although the magnitude
of these results are not unique in the literature (see Table 2 below) this additional element of the data is
beneficial in testing the robustness of theoretical relationships identified above. That is, conditional on the
model above being quantitatively accurate, the application of the same data and processes which finds output
multipliers in excess of 2.5 should lead to limited movements in government debt in response to changes in
tax policies.
The effects of a tax shock are estimated utlising the following VAR:
Xt = A0 +A1t+B(L)Xt−1 + C(L)dt + et (10)
where dt are the exogenous tax shocks whose size, timing and motivation is determined from narrative records
and where Xt is a vector of macroeconomic variables; B(L) and C(L) are lag polynomials with P and Q+ 1
lags respectively, and t is time. The tax shocks dt from these narrative studies are scaled by their projected
impact on tax liabilities as a fraction of total output; these projections are based on official calculations
assuming that the tax base remains the same. Specification (10) is line with that of Cloyne (2013) and
similar to that of Romer & Romer (2010). As a benchmark, Romer & Romer (2010) include only quarterly
output growth in Xt and set P = 0. Cloyne (2013), on the other hand, include output, consumption and
investment in Xt for their benchmark set of results. In both papers Q = 12 and both test their results to
the inclusion of other control variables in the specification. Our benchmark specification is to include a VAR
with output, consumption and investment as well as a measure of budgetary outcomes; however, sensitivity
will be conducted to cover a number of separate specifications applied in the literature.
Where possible, we apply the same data used in the original studies of Romer & Romer (2010) and
Cloyne (2013). The exception to this is a measure of the budgetary consequences of policy, which Romer &
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Romer (2010) and Cloyne (2013) do not consider. This is our key focus, and the inclusion of these outcomes
is the empirical contribution of the paper. For benchmark results, we use quarterly tax revenue to measure
the impact of exogenous tax changes on debt for two main reasons: first, it is the impact that fiscal policy
has on the tax base through which the theoretical dynamics above work, and therefore using tax revenues
can test this relationship directly; and second, quarterly data on tax revenues for the US and UK is available
for a longer time horizon than data on government debt.16
4.2 Results
The first column of Figure 5 illustrates the cumulative output impact of a one percentage point increase in
tax to GDP in the US (the top row) and the UK (the bottom row) respectively. In the case of the former, a
peak fall in GDP of 2.4% is observed after ten quarters, with similar effects for the UK. This figure is slightly
lower than that of Romer & Romer (2010) who estimate a peak multiplier of over 3; however, Romer &
Romer (2010) use a single equation version of (10), and once control variables are included, VAR estimates
are in line with ours (see Cloyne 2013). As is illustrated in the third and fourth columns of Figure 5, both
consumption and investment are estimated to fall in response to an exogenous tax rate increase, where the
latter is seen to respond more strongly; this is consistent with the results identified in both Romer & Romer
(2010) and Cloyne (2013) where investment is seen to respond more to exogenous tax shocks compared to
consumption.
The response of tax revenue to tax shocks is illustrated in the second column of Figure 5. In the case of
the US an increase in tax rates is predicted to increase tax revenues on impact; when output multipliers are
low (insignificant from zero), the tax base is unchanged and an increase in the tax rate leads to higher overall
revenues. As output multipliers increase, however, the impact of tax changes on tax revenues decreases; this
confirms the results predicted in the theoretical analysis above. As can be seen in Figure 5, the path of tax
revenues and output growth after an exogenous tax shock is similar; as cumulative output multipliers increase,
tax revenue responses decrease, both reaching extreme values after ten and eleven quarters respectively. It
is estimated that there is a neutral impact of tax rate changes on tax revenues after eleven quarters, where
output multipliers exceed 2.3. This result is in line with the estimates from Figure 4. Indeed, the trade-off
between output and debt in fiscal policy, as discussed in Sections 2 and 3, maps well to these empirical
estimates.
Examining the results for the UK, the second row in Figure 5 provides similar results as the US with
respect to supporting the theoretical analysis above. Although a similar path of cumulative output multipliers
is estimated for the UK, these are lower (especially during the first two years of the shock) than the US and
as such, the path of tax revenues is different. Here, tax revenues are not estimated to fall as a result of a
tax increase; that is, when output multipliers are not sufficiently high, the conventional result prevails that
higher tax rates lead to higher tax revenues. It should be noted, however, that the increase in tax revenues
resulting from tax rate rises is only statistically significant after twelve quarters, when cumulative output
multipliers are estimated to decrease.
Despite being common in the literature, it should highlighted that using one standard error confidence
16In the US, quarterly data on government debt is available from 1966 and for the UK from 1997. Whereas data on tax
receipts is available for the whole sample in both the US and UK from the St Louis Fed and Office for National Statistics,
respectively.
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Figure 5: Cumulative output, tax revenue, consumption and investment movements from an exogenous tax
increase
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Results from vector-autoregression estimations of (10) from an exogenous tax increase equal to one percentage point of GDP,
with growth in output (results in first column), tax revenue (results in second column), consumption (results in third column)
and investment (results in fourth column) in Xt. Both point estimates are presented as well as one standard error confidence
bands. The first row presents results when using data from the US, and the second row data from the UK.
bounds is the equivalent to a test probability of 68%. Although the results for the peak output multipliers
are statistically significant from zero at 95% confidence, this is not the case for the result with respect to
tax revenues. Two elements are noteworthy here: first, the intuition of the models developed in Section
2 and 3 are supported in this analysis, from the mapping of the point estimates for both output and debt
multipliers. Moreover, the fact that the results suggest an insignificant from zero change in tax revenues from
an increase in tax rates when the output effects are large (and after an initial statistically significant increase
in revenues) is compelling; debates typically implicitly assume an unambiguous positive association between
tax rates and tax revenues. Second, were a single equation approach taken as in Romer & Romer (2010)
providing more degrees of freedom in the estimation process, statistically significant falls in tax revenue two
years after an exogenous increase in tax rates would be observed in the US (these results are available in
Figure A2 in the online appendix); similarly, more conclusive results are found using a two variable VAR
with only output and tax revenues (these results are available in Figure A1 in the online appendix). This
result is also consistent with Mertens & Ravn (2013) who use the underlying data from Romer & Romer
(2010) and empirical estimates of changes in tax rates and tax bases to infer that cuts in tax rates have
either an insignificant from zero or positive impact on tax revenues; our results demonstrate this also the
case when analysing tax revenues directly.
16
4.3 Sensitivity
As discussed above, when following the approach of Romer & Romer (2010) and applying a single equation
approach, stronger results are found both with respect to the size of output multipliers and the movement in
tax rates; peak output multipliers of three and over one are achieved for the US and UK respectively after
ten quarters and the dynamics of tax revenues follows that of output multipliers as the theoretical models
predict. Further, more conclusive results are found when applying a two variable VAR with only growth
in output and tax revenues. Results can be found in the online appendix for the single equation approach
without (Figure A2) and with (Figure A3) a lagged dependent variable in the specification, and including
both a linear (Figure A4) and polynomial (Figure A5) time trend. Further, the two variable VAR results
are presented in Figure A1.
When considering the impact of those tax movements identified by Romer & Romer (2010) and Cloyne
(2013) as endogenous to the business cycle, a rise in the tax rate is estimated to reduce output and increase
tax revenues, and these effects are smaller than those from exogenous changes (peak output multipliers of
one in a VAR estimation); see Figures A6 and A7 in the online appendix. This is consistent with the concept
that fiscal policy endogenous to the business cycle is countercyclical and rises in tax rates occur mainly
during periods of economic expansion.
Using data on exogenous tax changes in Germany from Hayo & Uhl (2014) provides similar results to
those presented above; output multipliers reach a peak in excess of 2.5 and at this peak tax revenues are
estimated to fall in response to a tax rise. Quarterly data on German total tax revenue is only available
from 1991, and therefore the number of observations and statistical significance of the results are limited.
Finally, using changes to total government debt in the analysis (and not changes in tax revenue) provides
supportive, but statistically insignificant, results to those presented above. As discussed, UK quarterly data
on debt is only available from 1997 which provides insufficient observations for analysis. Using US data, a
rise in taxes is predicted to have an impact on debt insignificantly different from zero; however, after nine
quarters, the point estimates are for a rise in taxes to lead to a rise in debt, consistent with a fall in tax
revenues.17
5 Discussion
There is a strong similarity in the relationship between debt and output multipliers derived in the empirical
analysis compared to those found in the theoretical models of Sections 2 and 3, with support for two of
the three results first established in Section 2.18 Conditional on output multipliers in excess of 2.5, the
theoretical models predict that fiscal free lunches are possible; applying data and techniques which finds
such high output multipliers confirms this theoretical result. Figure 6 illustrates the similarity between the
17In addition to the above, the results were also tested to the additional procedures performed in both Romer & Romer
(2010) and Cloyne (2013). In the case of the former, specifications which include control variables for government spending and
monetary policy independent of the business cycle deliver quantitatively similar estimates for output and tax revenue movements
in response to exogenous tax movements; this is expected given that similar processes performed in Romer & Romer (2010) also
provide similar results to their benchmark estimates. In the case of Cloyne (2013), including inflation and the nominal interest
rate in the VAR specification too delivers similar estimates for output and tax revenue movements in response to exogenous
tax changes; again, this is as expected as these additional checks had limited impact on multiplier estimates in Cloyne (2013).
18Note that with empirical results only performed on tax changes, no support (or otherwise) can be provided for the theoretical
result that government spending changes will influence debt more than tax changes, all other things being equal.
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Figure 6: Estimated output and tax revenue multipliers from empirical results
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Output and tax revenue multipliers from Figure 5 where in the case of tax revenue movements, the point estimates from the
empirical work are multiplied by the average tax revenue to GDP for the US (25.5%) and UK (32.6%) to create multipliers.
Further, these multipliers are multiplied by minus one in order to get results visually similar to those from the theoretical
analysis (which were based on government debt multipliers: note a positive tax revenue multiplier would translate to a negative
debt multiplier, all other things being equal). A line of best fit is plotted with 95% confidence bounds.
theoretical and empirical results through a scatter plot where each point represents output and tax revenue
multipliers from the empirical results in Figure 5; tax revenue movements are used for proxies for debt
multipliers by multiplying these by the negative of the fraction of tax revenue to GDP. Although there is
more variation in these results compared to the theoretical analysis, the elasticity of the debt multiplier to
the output multiplier is similar to those identified in Figure 2.
This suggests that there is a lack of a trade-off between fiscal stimulus and debt at output multipliers
of 2.5. Table 2 highlights a number of empirical and theoretical papers which estimate multipliers within
(or close to) this value.19 By extension, therefore, there is a growing literature estimating high output
multipliers, and the results of this paper combined with this literature suggests that fiscal policy trade-offs
are not present (or are limited) in these scenarios. A natural question arising from this, therefore, is when
are these scenarios most likely? That is, when is it possible that fiscal trade-offs are minimised? A review
of Table 2 suggests answers to this question.
There is a considerable literature estimating that the impact of fiscal policy is asymmetric, with higher
multipliers in recessionary times; the middle section of Table 2 presents the range of multiplier estimates
from some of this literature. If debt is the trade-off for expansionary fiscal policy, the results from this paper
suggests that a unit increase in the output multiplier leads to a decrease in this trade-off of the marginal tax
rate (between 0.3 and 0.5 for most OECD countries). This would suggest significant arbitrage conditions
whereby deficit financed expansions during recessionary periods can be ‘repaid’ at a lower cost during periods
19It should be noted that Table 2 selectively highlights those papers finding results with large multipliers. Studies using a
structural VAR approach (see for example Blanchard & Perotti 2002) typically find smaller multipliers.
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Table 2: Multiplier estimates from the empirical and theoretical literature
Paper Multiplier Notes
Empirical literature
Acconcia et al. (2014) 1.9 As a result from spending cuts
Cloyne (2013) 2.5 After eleven quarters
Guajardo et al. (2014) 3.1 After two years, with consolidations based
on taxes
Hayo & Uhl (2014) 2.4 After eight quarters
Mertens & Ravn (2013) 2.2 After eight quarters
Romer & Romer (2010) 3.0 After ten quarters
Asymmetric fiscal multipliers literature
Auerbach & Gorodnichenko (2012) 0 - 1.7
Output multiplier estimates in expansions
and recessions, respectively
Bachmann & Sims (2012) 0.8 - 3.1
Caggiano et al. (2015) 0.3 - 3.1
Theoretical literature
Christiano et al. (2011) 3.7 With the zero lower bound on monetary
policy
Romer & Bernstein (2009) 1.6 Government spending multiplier after 8
quarters
Estimates of multipliers from both the empirical and theoretical literature. In the case of the literature finding asymmetric
impacts of policy over the business cycle, a range of estimates is provided; the smallest value for estimated multipliers are for
those during economic expansions, and the largest values for those in recessions.
of economic growth.20 Moreover, given the size of fiscal multiplers estimated during a recession, potential
fiscal free lunches may be possible.
The findings of Acconcia et al. (2014) suggest that local fiscal multipliers (those measured for a specific
region) may be higher than national multipliers (those measured across a whole country) as the budgetary
and monetary policy effects are experienced nationally whereas the initial fiscal shock are local. As such, if
local output multipliers are larger than national ones, there may also be more scope for localised fiscal free
lunches.21
Mertens & Ravn (2013) estimate that the movement of durable goods is more responsive to personal tax
changes than the movement of non-durable expenditure. This suggests that policies which target specifically
private consumption of durable goods are more likely to lead to fiscal free lunches; however, Berger & Vavra
(2014) estimate that the response of durable consumption to fiscal shocks is conditional on the state of the
economy, with smaller movements during recessionary periods as there is a cost to adjusting this type of
consumption. These two results suggest, therefore, that policies which target durable spending in booms,
and non-durable spending in recessions are more likely to be associated with lower fiscal trade-offs.
Considering the other side of the debate, the absence of fiscal trade-offs during debt consolidations
(expansionary fiscal contractions) could result from the estimates in Auerbach & Gorodnichenko (2012) and
Caggiano et al. (2015) in Table 2 (among others) who estimate that government spending multipliers may
20When we estimate multipliers using the non-linear approach applied in Auerbach & Gorodnichenko (2013), we further find
support for asymmetric fiscal multipliers; output multipliers are estimated to be statistically insignificant from zero during
expansions, whereas during recessions they are estimated to be larger than those found in Figure 5. Correspondingly, there is
estimated to be an increase in tax revenues from tax rate cuts during a recession, and the opposite during expansions.
21It should be noted that Dupor & Guerrero (2017) find local and national output multipliers are good approximations for
one another, and do not considerably diverge.
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be close to zero during expansion. This is consistent with the results from Alesina et al. (2014) who estimate
that expansionary fiscal contractions are more likely from government spending cuts (compared to tax rises)
which has theoretical support from equations (5) and (6) above. Moreover, Alesina et al. (2014) estimate
that persistent reductions in government spending have a greater positive effect on business confidence and
private investment, and these longer-term changes are more associated with potential expansionary fiscal
contractions.22
6 Conclusions
This paper has developed a theoretical framework with which to analyse the impact of fiscal policy on both
debt and output; the results from this framework were then subsequently tested empirically. The results from
the paper can be applied to consider trade-offs from potential fiscal policy actions. Indeed, the empirical
results suggest that such trade-offs might not be present with output multipliers recently estimated in the
literature. That is, potential ‘fiscal free lunches’ are possible, with tax revenues rising (or at least not falling)
in response to tax cuts.
The results from this paper are striking, but to confidently rely on these, further research is required.
Our results suggest that conditional on output multipliers in excess of 2.5, fiscal free lunches are possible.
Further, empirically applying data which finds output multipliers in the region of 2.5 provides support for
this conclusion; however, there is some scepticism in the literature over recent high estimates for output
multipliers (see for example Favero & Giavazzi 2012, Perotti 2012, Hebous & Zimmermann 2017, among
others). If fiscal free lunches require high output multipliers, which is supported by both the theoretical
and empirical results in this paper, and if this magnitude of effects is not accepted as a fair and consistent
result, it puts doubt on the inference that fiscal trade-offs may not occur. One direct way to consider
this formally would be for those papers which find high output multipliers to directly test for the impact
on budgetary outcomes. In particular, the empirical results of this paper do not consider the impact of
government spending shocks, and extensions in this dimension would further contribute to our results. If
potential fiscal free lunches are restricted only to the case of cuts in tax rates, this may signal that the results
above derive from the distortionary nature of taxes, which could provide evidence of a Laffer curve (see for
example Trabandt & Uhlig 2011). Moreover, extensions to the literature which finds fiscal multipliers to
be asymmetric (see for example Auerbach & Gorodnichenko 2012, Bachmann & Sims 2012, Caggiano et al.
2015, discussed above) to consider how the budgetary outcomes of policy differ with this asymmetry would
be a significant contribution. Even in the absence of free lunches, potential fiscal arbitrage opportunities
through deficit financed counter-cyclical policy may be present with such asymmetric effects.
The key objective of this paper was to reflect further on fiscal policy trade-offs between output and
debt, and to test the implied assumption that this trade-off is prevalent. When combined with recent
literature on the effects of policy on output, the results suggest that expansionary contractions are possible
(with literature that estimates low multipliers), that fiscal free lunches are possible (with literature that
estimate high multipliers), and that there are considerable benefits to counter-cyclical policy in the presence
22Indeed, when performing simulations similar to those in Section 3 in Figures 2 and 3, we find that more persistent fiscal
shocks are associated with expansionary fiscal contractions where debt is cut faster compared to less persistent fiscal shocks.
Further, expansionary fiscal contractions are more likely in these simulations with more persistent fiscal shocks as output
multipliers are on average estimated to be lower, and therefore, closer to zero.
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of asymmetric fiscal multipliers. This naturally implies highly desirable policy implications, which would
benefit from further empirical and theoretical research in the areas outlined above.
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A The model and calibration
A.1 Model equations
The model is a Smets & Wouters (2003, 2007) model extended to include both an extended fiscal section (as
discussed in Section 3.1) and non-Ricardian, or ‘hand-to-mouth’, consumers. Please see Table A1 for a full
list of model equations.
Table A1: Model equations
Households
Ricardian consumption: 1
CRt −hCRt−1
= Et
[
β
Rt
pit+1
1+τct
1+τc
t+1
1
CR
t+1
−hCRt
]
Capital adjustment: Qt =
Etpit+1
Rt
Et
[
Qt+1(1− δ) +
(
1− τkt+1
)
rt+1
]
Investment: 1 = Qt
[
1− φ2 − 3φ2
(
It
It−1
)2
+
2φIt
It−1
]
+ φEt
{
Qt+1pit+1
Rt
[(
It+1
It
)3 − ( It+1It )2
]}
Capital accumulation: Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 +
[
1− φ2
(
It
It−1 − 1
)2]
It
Non-Ricardian consumption: (1 + τct )C
NR
t =
(
1− τ lt
)
wtL
NR
t + TRt
FOC w.r.t. w˜: f1,t = f2,t
f1,t =
(νw−1)
νw
w˜t
1−τlt
(1+τct )
(
CRt −hCRt−1
) ( w˜t
wt
)−νw
Nt + βθw
(
w˜t
w˜t+1
pi
γ
t
pit+1
)1−νw
f1,t+1
f2,t =
(
w˜t
wt
)−νw(1+σL)
N
1+σL
t + (βθw)
(
w˜t
w˜t+1
pi
γ
t
pit+1
)−νw(1+σL)
f2,t+1
Wage index: w1−νwt = (1− θw) w˜
1−νw
t + θw
(
pi
γw
t−1wt−1
pit
)1−νw
Firms
Private output: Yt = K
α
t−1
(
NPt
)1−α (
KGt−1
)αg − ( 1νp−1)Y
Wage-rental ratio: (1− α) rtKt−1 = α (1 + τert )wtNPt
Real marginal cost: mct =
(
1
1−α
)1−α (
1
α
)α [(1 + τert )wt]1−α rαt (KGt−1)−αg
Prices: νpd1,t = (νp − 1) d2,t
d1,t = mctp˜
−(νp+1)
t Yt + βθp
(
CRt −hCRt−1
)
(1+τct )(
CR
t+1
−hCRt
)(
1+τc
t+1
) ( p˜t
p˜t+1
)−νp−1 ( pit
pit+1
)−νp
d1,t+1
d2,t = p˜
−νp
t Yt + βθp
(
CRt −hCRt−1
)
(1+τct )(
CR
t+1
−hCRt
)(
1+τc
t+1
) ( p˜t
p˜t+1
)−νp ( piγt
pit+1
)1−νp
d2,t+1
1 = (1− θp) p
1−νp
t + θp
(
pi
γ
t−1
pit
)1−νp
Monetary policy
Taylor rule: Rt = R
(
Rt−1
R
)ρ [(pit
pi
)ρpi (GDPt
GDP
)ρy ]1−ρ
Market clearing definitions
Goods market clearing: Yt = Ct + It +G
C
t + I
G
t
Total consumption: Ct = λC
NR
t + (1− λ)CRt
Labour market clearing: Nt = N
P
t +N
G
t
GDP: GDPt = Yt + (1 + τ
er
t )wtN
G
t
Note that the fiscal sector was discussed in Section 3.1. CR, CNR, h, λ and β represent Ricardian and non-Ricardian consumption,
habit persistence, the share of non-Ricardian households and the discount factor, respectively. Q, δ and rk represent is the shadow price
of capital, depreciation and the rental rate. K and φ represent private capital and an investment adjustment cost, respectively. W , P , θ
and γ represent wages, prices, stickiness in both and indexing in both, respectively, and ν represents the elasticity of substitution across
goods (νp) and labour (νw). mc, α and σG represent marginal costs and the elasticity of capital and public capital in the production
function, respectively, and d1 and d2 are expressions that allow us to present the first-order condition for p˜t (the price which maximises
profits for intermediate firm producers at time t) in a recursive form; f1 and f2 are expressions that allow us to present the first-order
condition for w˜t (the wage which maximises profits for trade unions at time t) in a recursive form. All other variables are as defined
in the main body of the paper.
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A.2 Calibration and simulations
In the benchmark simulation results certain parameters are fixed and do not change in each iteration. These
include those parameters which are commonly fixed in the literature: δ = 0.025, δG = 0.02, νw = 6.67,
β = 0.99, α = 0.31 and σg = 0.02. Further, to simplify the analysis, the benchmark results are obtained
holding fiscal parameters fixed, as outlined in Section 3.3.
The simulations are conducted varying other parameters, the distributions for which are based on those
from the literature which estimates these parameters; specifically, the distribution over which the parame-
ters are randomised are modelled to closely resemble estimates of the first and second moments for these
parameters in Smets & Wouters (2007) when the model is calibrated to the US, and Smets & Wouters (2003)
when the model is calibrated to the UK. Details of which are in Table A.2.
Table A2: Random distribution for parameters in DSGE simulations
US simulations UK simulations
Parameter Distribution Mean StdDev Distribution Mean StdDev
φ N(6.40,1.01) 6.40 1.01 N(6.05,1.01) 6.05 1.01
κ N(0.29,0.06) 0.29 0.06 N(0.18,0.08) 0.18 0.08
σl N(2.09,0.60) 2.09 0.60 N(1.27,0.82) 1.27 0.82
σc N(1.69,0.28) 1.69 0.28 N(1.61,0.29) 1.61 0.29
γp N(0.44,0.11) 0.44 0.11 N(0.43,0.10) 0.43 0.10
γw N(0.33,0.11) 0.33 0.11 N(0.66,0.20) 0.66 0.20
θp B(4.66,0.49) 0.91 0.01 B(5.93,0.59) 0.91 0.01
θw B(3.06,0.71) 0.81 0.03 B(2.82,0.91) 0.76 0.04
h B(1.81,0.92) 0.66 0.06 B(1.22,0.99) 0.55 0.08
Φ N(1.60,0.07) 1.60 0.07 N(1.50,0.21) 1.50 0.21
λ B(0.25,0.63) 0.29 0.11 B(0.25,0.63) 0.29 0.11
ρ B(3.04,0.42) 0.88 0.02 B(3.21,0.25) 0.93 0.02
ρpi N(1.50,0.11) 1.50 0.11 N(1.67,0.10) 1.67 0.10
ρy N(0.07,0.03) 0.07 0.03 N(0.14,0.04) 0.14 0.04
Distributions and their first and second moments, as determined by Smets & Wouters (2007) for the US, and Smets & Wouters
(2003) for the UK. Where the parameter is theoretically bounded by zero and one, a beta (‘B’) distribution was applied.
B Sensitivity plots
The following are figures testing the robustness of results from Section 4.
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Figure A1: Cumulative output multipliers and tax movements from an exogenous tax increase: two variable
VAR results
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Results from vector-autoregression estimations of (10) from an exogenous tax increase equal to one percentage point of GDP,
with both output growth and tax revenue growth in Xt. Both point estimates are presented as well as one standard error
confidence bands.
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Figure A2: Cumulative output multipliers and tax movements from an exogenous tax increase: single
equation results
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Results from estimations of (10) from an exogenous tax increase equal to one percentage point of GDP, with output growth as
the only variable of interest in the top row, and tax revenue growth in the bottom row. Both point estimates are presented as
well as one standard error confidence bands. Note all graphs present percentage changes in the variable of interest and therefore
to obtain tax revenue multipliers, one would need to multiply by the tax share in the economy, 0.255 for the US and 0.326 for
the UK in the sample period.
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Figure A3: Sensitivity: single equation approach using lagged dependent variable
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Results applying the same process as in Figure A2 now including 12 lags of the dependent variable in the specification (P = 12
in (10).
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Figure A4: Sensitivity: single equation approach using linear time trend
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Quarter
-3.5
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
Ou
tp
ut
 m
ov
em
en
t
US data
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Quarter
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
Ou
tp
ut
 m
ov
em
en
t
UK data
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Quarter
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
Ou
tp
ut
 m
ov
em
en
t
Combined data
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Quarter
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
Ta
x r
ev
en
ue
 m
ov
em
en
t
US data
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Quarter
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Ta
x r
ev
en
ue
 m
ov
em
en
t
UK data
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Quarter
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
Ta
x r
ev
en
ue
 m
ov
em
en
t
Combined Data
Results applying the same process as in Figure A2 now including a linear time trend in the specification.
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Figure A5: Sensitivity: single equation approach using polynomial time trend
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Results applying the same process as in Figure A2 now including a second order polynomial time trend in the specification.
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Figure A6: Cumulative output multipliers and tax movements: single equation approach using endogenous
shocks
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Results applying the same process as in Figure A2 now using those shocks identified in Romer & Romer (2010) and Cloyne
(2013) as endogenous to the business cycle.
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Figure A7: Cumulative output multipliers and tax movements: VAR approach using endogenous shocks
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Results applying the same process as in Figure A1 now using those shocks identified in Romer & Romer (2010) and Cloyne
(2013) as endogenous to the business cycle.
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